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theology. To follow out this history in detail is not a pleasant task, for the first suggestion it makes, and makes with no little force, is that the energy of the Church was being largely taken up with metaphysical subtleties and logical contradictions. The mischief arose because from the end of the second century Christianity was being made more and more into an Orthodoxy (*i. e.*, an authoritative dogmatic system), each pronouncement being taken as final and as incapable of modification even in form. This is the system that is now breaking down. I do not say that it was all a mere process of corruption (in the manner suggested by Joseph Priestley in his "History of the Corruptions of Christianity"),—a baseless fabric of mere human invention. I say that the work of the modern thinker is not to destroy ancient dogmas, but to discover and enlarge their deeper meaning, which underlies the defects or errors which may disfigure the form of their expression. The growing consciousness of what is demanded by veracity, in the present day, emphasizes all these considerations, and, in the name of morality and intelligence, adds to them a crowning demand of immense and fundamental importance: this process of enlargement and reconstruction is not consistent *with a retention of the ancient dogmatic forms*. And notwithstanding a radical divergence from Dr. Coit's main argument and proposals, which would make the existing religious confusion ten times worse confounded, I believe that religious reformers will welcome these volumes of his, as containing many helpful suggestions towards the ideals which they have in view; and they will all the more regret that so able and enthusiastic a teacher has allowed himself to be fascinated by a scheme involving the retention of forms which humanity has outgrown.

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THE ETHICS OF PROGRESS: OR THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE BY WHICH CIVILIZATION PROCEEDS. By Charles F. Dole. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1909. Pp. iv, 398.

"The design of this book is to set forth a simple, philosophical and inspiring vital principle, which governs all ethical questions, and insures the development of noble, useful, and happy

character." There is no *a priori* reason why one who is not a professional teacher of philosophy should not succeed in this rather ambitious, but very laudable design. Indeed, the very freedom from the familiar daily use of the formulas and distinctions of the schools might lend an air of freshness and originality to an author's work; especially when the author does not obtrude upon the reader any knowledge he may possess of the history of ethical discussion. Mr. Dole is so careful not to refer to the views of individual moralists that when he writes: "As Kant, quoted by Thomas Hill Green, says, 'Nothing can be conceived in the world or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, but a good will,' " the reference is striking and one wonders whether he means to intimate that he has read Green or that he has not read Kant. Mr. Dole, moreover, has the pen of a ready writer and a very genius for expansion. In this instance he has succeeded in expanding his 'vital principle' into a volume the size of which is not explained even by the fact that its substance was originally given in a course of lectures before the Brooklyn Institute. In spite of these obvious advantages, I do not mean to imply that Mr. Dole has written a good book; still less, that it will utterly fail in its purpose of "helping men in the art of the good life." "The main object of the book is practical," and it should doubtless be judged from the pragmatic point of view. But that each reader must do for himself. I must be content first to say that to dig out the ore from this mountain of words is a tedious process; and then to illustrate the character, instead of summarizing the contents of the book.

Ethics is defined as "the art of living together humanely" (p. 266). "Ethics is social conduct" (p. 97). "Ethics and theism are one" (p. 145). Ethics and religion are also said to be one. Mr. Dole is thus quite unembarrassed by the 'subtle' distinctions of philosophers. He holds that "what counts most in the study of ethics is wealth of observation and richness of experience." The 'professional student' will be relieved to learn, however, that while he is at a certain disadvantage (p. 18), yet "ethics and happiness are not opposed, but harmonious with each other" (p. 62).

Happiness is a word to conjure with: it can easily be turned into so many different things. Happiness is defined as satisfaction. We should, however, aim at the highest happiness, and

this consists in the expression of the highest form of life, namely, good will. The happiest man will be the most perfect ethical man, *i. e.*, the man of good will or the man who desires nothing but the social good (pp. 69, 73, 77). Mr. Dole does not distinguish between quantitative and qualitative hedonism; he simply assumes that highest happiness and greatest happiness are identical. He also thinks "it hardly needs to be said that the individual and the social welfare are not antagonistic but one and the same" (p. 81), and he denies the reality of sacrifice (p. 73) and of evil (pp. 170-180). These statements will not disturb the philosopher who delights in paradoxes and seeks to explain them, though they may possibly provoke the dissent of the plain man for whose edification the book is evidently written and who is less of a born optimist than the author.

Mr. Dole recognizes two rival ethical theories, the Epicurean or utilitarian, and the idealistic. "The characteristic emphasis of the utilitarian theory is in all cases the same, namely, its assertion that the grand and persuasive motive of ethics in each individual is his own happiness or welfare." That is, of course, a terminological inexactitude. Nor will the opponents of utilitarianism readily admit that "they have not succeeded in giving a clear and consistent account of their thought." Mr. Dole believes that "the facts of ethical experience build up into a theory of conduct wherein there is no discrepancy between the two views which have usually been thought opposed to one another" (pp. 18-22). He brings them into a 'comprehensive harmony' by the easy device of emphasizing 'the pleasure of goodness,' and hastily concluding that duty and happiness are always harmonious, if not identical.

The principle of good will is the key to all the problems of ethics. Be a man of good will and you will do right as a matter of natural consequence (p. 89). Mr. Dole casually recognizes the distinction between subjective and objective rightness (p. 127), but he is apparently unconscious of any difficulty in giving definite content to the idea of duty. He treats of the right in a series of parables. Right is like a highway as distinguished from the innumerable private trails; it is a mode of efficiency and is like the wire which carries energy; it is like the circulation of the blood; it is like the essential conditions of a partnership and the delicate adjustment of a wonderful

piece of mechanism; it is also like the movement of life in every plant or tree (pp. 147-154). "Right, welfare, happiness, life, fulfillment are all one, as befits an orderly and rational universe." Now I submit that all this is far from illuminating. When Mr. Dole says in plain language, at the end of the chapter preceding his parabolic treatment, that "right is the method by which we bring about social welfare," we understand his meaning; but if the good will is a key to open all the problems of ethics, Kant should have made all subsequent discussion of them superfluous.

Mr. Dole's ethical theory is as conspicuously optimistic as it is eclectic. His whole theory,—of moral progress, of the educability and perfectibility of man, of the good will, of freedom and responsibility, of the essential unity of goodness and happiness,—is determined by a religious metaphysic of a peculiarly irritating optimistic kind. Hence I do not quite see how his ethics (which derives its optimistic tone from "the eminently religious philosophy upon which it seems to rest") "also holds good whether or not we accept the underlying philosophy" (pp. iv, 103). In discussing responsibility, blame, guilt, and desert in relation to conduct, he denies that these ideas involve any metaphysical theory about the freedom of the will, though he admits that "a logical question arises" if we deny that the wrongdoer could have done right and at the same time hold him responsible for his conduct. The author's own 'moral determinism' appears to involve more metaphysic than I have time to describe otherwise than by saying that the 'will of God' is given as an equivalent phrase (p. 263). It involves the belief that men are definitely improvable and educable, born for good and not for evil; that goodness is at the heart of the universe and is gradually working itself out through the good will of individuals, until we shall finally have a perfect society composed of persons possessed of the ideal freedom which we impute to God. Meanwhile men are not responsible for their conduct in the older and ordinary sense of responsibility, but they are praised and blamed and held responsible by society in order to furnish them with adequate motives for changing their mode of life; and for practical purposes this is held to be sufficient.

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